Disturbing rhythms: James, Merleau-Ponty, music, and self-transformation by Johnson, Marc
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISTURBING RHYTHMS: 
JAMES, MERLEAU-PONTY, MUSIC AND SELF-TRANSFORMATION 
 
 
BY  
MARC J. JOHNSON 
 
 
 
THESIS 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in Religion 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Master’s Committee: 
  
Professor Jonathan H. Ebel 
Professor Bruce Rosenstock 
Professor Dov Y. Weiss 
 
 
 
  
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
One often interprets one’s selfhood in a Cartesian way. That is, the everyday self is a 
clearly demarcated individual that is separate from others and from the world around it 
(including, to a large extent, its own body). Although this is the most common understanding of 
one’s ipseity, there are contexts where this Cartesian self is overthrown and an alternative 
identity emerges. Such states of transformation, as I will call them, are often induced in contexts 
where music plays a prevalent role. Indeed, musicians and their audiences have reported 
experiencing a new kind of connection, a new found unity with others and the world around them 
when creating/appreciating music. Historically, many of these transformations have taken place 
in religious contexts and have, therefore, been construed as religious experiences. For example, 
the initiate of the Dionysian mystery cult would dance to music on the mountainside in order to 
enter into an ecstatic state and meet her god face to face. This paper will explore music’s role in 
inducing such states of transformation. Its starting point will be William James’ analysis of such 
states in his The Varieties of Religious Experience. Here, James continues his phenomenological 
task of cataloguing all forms of consciousness. Unfortunately, this highly fecund project was 
ignored by prominent European phenomenologists during the 20
th
-century and the French 
phenomenologist Maurice-Merleau-Ponty was no exception. However, this paper will show that 
both Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology and his late ontology (in conversation with James’ 
earlier analysis) offer significant theoretical tools with which to explore such states and their 
relationship with religious experience.  
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 I. Introduction  
 
“O 
Blessed, truly happy is he  
Who knows the rituals 
Of the god, who joins his spirit 
With the holy worshipers in the mountains,  
Who through the holy purifying rites 
Becomes one of the Bakkhai
1” 
 
 
In a well-known passage from The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James 
suggests that  
“…our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of 
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness 
entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at 
a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their 
field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other 
forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question,--for they are so discontinuous with 
ordinary consciousness. Yet, they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region 
though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality…2   
William James’ analysis of altered states of consciousness in Varieties was part of his 
overarching project of giving a phenomenological account of all forms of consciousness. 
Cognizant of the pioneering work being done by German proto-phenomenologist (that is, pre-
Husserlian phenomenologists) like Carl Stumpf and Franz Brentano
3
, James wished to go 
                                                          
1
 Euripides. “Bacchae”. Trans: Reginald Gibbons and Charles Segal. The Complete Euripides Volume IV: Bacchae 
and Other Plays. Eds. Peter Burian and Alan Shapiro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 248 
2
 James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Penguin Inc, 1958. p. 298 
3
 Indeed, not only was William James cognizant of what I have called proto-phenomenology, he may have well had 
a large influence on Edmund Husserl’s thought. For example, Husserl only gave up psychologism after having read 
James’ The Principles of Psychology.  On this and other potential Jamesian influences on Husserl’s thought, see 
Wilshire, Bruce. William James and Phenomenology: a Study of ‘The Principles of Psychology.’ Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1968.  
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beyond a phenomenology of “waking consciousness” to an analysis of extraordinary states of 
mind. Unfortunately, this fecund project was ignored by European phenomenologists, the French 
phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty being no exception. However, this paper will show 
that, without misappropriation, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the lived body can help 
elucidate altered states of consciousness by examining their mode of production, viz. changes in 
the body’s relationship to the world. His early philosophy set to explain the primordial subject 
(the lived body) and its innate relationship with the world. As Gary Brent Madison points out, for 
Merleau-Ponty “All bodily or perceptual experience, then, does not depend on intellectual 
function which would structure it in accordance with certain norms or criteria possessed by 
virtue of its own nature; on the contrary, it is intelligence or reason which is supported by 
perceptual life (p. 52; my emphasis).” Although intellectual life or the Cartesian cogito cannot be 
reduced to the body, the latter, qua primordial subject, is the foundation upon which the former 
develops. This invites the task, then, to explore the ways in which the body’s relationship with 
the world can be changed to such a degree that altered states of consciousness can arise. In 
analyzing such states, we will explore the theoretical framework that William James offers by 
explicitly contrasting it with that of the early Merleau-Ponty. The latter, I will argue, provides an 
interpretation of such experiences that is ultimately reductionist. On the other hand, although 
remaining agnostic, James allows for the possibility of a genuine encounter with external forces 
or agents. Throughout the paper, I will explore some prominent features of states of 
transformation and those settings that tend to induce them. In particular, this paper will address 
the importance of musical appreciation (listening, dance, etc.) and musical creation in 
fundamentally changing the body’s perception of the world and therefore the individual’s self-
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understanding and her understanding of the world. For example, when asked about the rave 
experience, an interviewee had this to say: 
“Fundamentally, there’s this sense of, I want to say dissociation of the self, but a loss of ego is what I had been 
referring to before. The sense of there’s no separation between you and everything else. Like you are not you, like 
you are not this individual that has this stuff that is about this thing that happened three years ago, you know, all the 
things that come with individuation—your ego, your fears, your hopes, your dreams, all this stuff that is identified as 
self.”4 
  Such unusual experiences demand a phenomenological analysis. Towards that end, I will 
seek to show music’s ability to fundamentally change not only the phenomenal field, but also the 
self’s relation to itself; that is, I will explore music’s ability to produce these states of 
transformation. Finally, I contend that the differences between James and the early Merleau-
Ponty (most importantly, the difference between the former’s openness to alterity and latter’s 
reductionism) are lessened as the latter’s thought matures into his ontology of the flesh. Before 
looking at some examples of states of transformation, however, it would be prudent to become 
familiar with Merleau-Ponty’s early thought.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Quoted in Sylvan, Robin. Trance Formation: The Spiritual and Religious Dimensions of Global Rave Culture. 
New York: Routledge, 2005. p. 74 
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II. The Phenomenology of Perception  
 Since the beginning of his career, Merleau-Ponty argued against a modernist conception 
of the self. For this thinker, the idea that there is a clear ontological distinction between 
consciousness and the body is rooted in a Cartesian delusion. In order to adequately describe 
human experience, the phenomenologist needs to recognize the fundamental connection between 
these two aspects of one’s being; that is, the phenomenologist has to recognize that one is an 
embodied consciousness. The philosopher needs to recognize that one is conscious of the world 
through one’s body. The body is the primordial subject that reaches out to the world. For 
Merleau-Ponty, however, studying the body’s relation to the world is not to take up the task of 
the biologist. The objective body (the body that can be accessed equally by everyone) of the 
scientist is a derivative conception of embodiment. Instead, Merleau-Ponty posits the lived body, 
the body as conscious actor in the world, as primordial. He states that, unlike objects that present 
themselves through diverse perspectives, the body presents just one perspective to the subject. 
Furthermore (and perhaps more importantly), one’s body is never in front of one (as an object 
can be); instead, it is with one.  That is, it is that with which one explores the diverse perspectives 
of objects and thus the world. It provides the point of view from which one engages with objects. 
This relationship is magical, Merleau-Ponty says since one’s body moves “directly” or, rather, 
the movements of one’s body are concomitant with one’s decision to move. 
In seeing an object, one’s gaze reaches out to the object to envelop it; to interrogate it (the 
same is true of the other senses). The body is the being that, through its openness to the world, 
can navigate and unfold the world. This should not be understood, however, as a one-sided 
activity. 
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“[M]y gaze pairs off with colour, and my hand with hardness and softness, and in this transaction between 
the subject of sensation and the sensible it cannot be held that one acts while the other suffers the action, or that one 
confers significance on the other. Apart from the probing of my eye or my hand, and before my body synchronizes 
with it, the sensible is nothing but a vague beckoning.”5 
 Far from privileging the subject’s role in perception, Merleau-Ponty writes “…I give ear, 
or look, in the expectation of a sensation, and suddenly the sensible takes possession of my ear or 
my gaze, and I surrender a part of  my body, even my whole body, to this particular manner of 
vibrating and filling space known as blue or red…”6 As Kearney stresses, Merleau-Ponty 
believes that there is a communion between the body and the world.  This communion is 
facilitated by the body’s ability to adopt habits which are ways of acting or reaching out to the 
world that it has learned and that are now engrained in it. Crucially, however, Merleau-Ponty 
does not think that one’s body is fixed within prescribed physical parameters. Instead, he argues 
that, through habit, an individual can extend her lived body. Instruments can be 
“…incorporate[d]…into the bulk of our own body.”7 This is described, most famously, with the 
account of the blind man and his stick.  
“The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer perceived for itself; its point has 
become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight. In the 
exploration of things, the length of the stick does not enter expressly as a middle term: the blind man is rather aware 
of it through the position of objects than of the position of objects through it.” 
The stick becomes an extension of the blind man’s body; it becomes a substitute 
appendage with which he can navigate through the world. Similarly, a car can become an 
extension of one’s self. It is a vehicle that one controls (with the original “vehicle” or body that 
                                                          
5
 Quoted in Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1997. p.53 
6
 Quoted in Abram, p. 55 
7
 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge, 2002. P.166 
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one is) to navigate through the world. “Habit expresses our power of dilating our being-in-the-
world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments.”8 
The body, then, is the point of departure for one’s experience of the world. It is the point 
of view from which the world is experienced. Yet, how do we account for this primordial 
relationship? To explain the body’s fundamental relation with the world, Merleau-Ponty posits a 
“tacit cogito” which he describes as the primordial wisdom between the body and the world.9 
This tacit cogito is also that which serves as the ground upon which reflective consciousness 
grows. Madison writes 
“It is thus necessary to recognize, beneath all active or thematic intentionality, an ‘operative intentionality 
already at work before any positing or any judgment, a ‘Logos of the aesthetic world’’ which is the very ‘condition 
of possibility’ of all constitutive operations on the part of the thinking subject. Before any intellectual operation of 
signification, existence is already fully significant and thus, if the Cogito or reflective consciousness is undeniably a 
fact, it is in a way a secondary fact, that is, a founded fact…(54)”10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 Ibid. p. 165-6 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 Madison, Gary Brent. Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: A Search for the Limits of Consciousness.  Trans: Gary 
Brent Madison. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1990.  
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III. States of Transformation 
 Now that we are familiar with Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology, we can begin to 
examine states of transformation and William James’ analysis of them. As is well-known, James’ 
own description of religion and religious experience in Varieties is carefully circumscribed. To 
start out, he explicitly notes that he will not be talking about the institutional manifestations of 
religion.
11
 That is, he will not be discussing the papacy, caste systems, etc. Instead, what interests 
James is the individual’s religious experiences; that is, he is interested in the phenomenology of 
religious experiences. Yet, circumscribing his task in this way does not eliminate all potential 
problems. For example, he notes that “…the word ‘religion’ cannot stand for any single principle 
or essence, but is rather a collective name.”12 Further, he denies that there can be any single 
religious emotion. In his discussion about mysticism, therefore, he finds it prudent to offer four 
criteria (the first two of which are both necessary and sufficient to constitute a mystical 
experience for James, while the latter two “…are usually found”13):  
1) the ineffability of the experience,  
2) a noetic quality that characterizes the experience as offering genuine, deep insight into 
the nature of reality,  
3) the transiency of the experience, and  
4) the passivity of the recipient—as if an external being or force were the active agent.  
Clearly, these criteria do not of themselves have anything exclusively religious (as this 
term is usually understood) about them. In discussing Emersonianism, for example, James writes 
                                                          
11
 Ibid. p. 41 
12
 Ibid. p. 39 
13
 Ibid. p. 293 
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“We must therefore, from the experiential point of view, call these godless or quasi-godless 
creeds ‘religions’; and accordingly when in our definition of religion we speak of the 
individual’s  relation to ‘what he considers the divine,’ we must interpret the term ‘divine’ very 
broadly, as denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not.”14 So, 
determining what kind of experiences should be considered ‘religious’ as opposed to, for 
example, ‘aesthetic’ can be a difficult task. In responding to this difficulty, James is forthright: 
“Rather than prolong such a dispute [about names], I am willing to accept almost any name for 
the personal religion of which I propose to treat. Call it conscience or morality, if you yourselves 
prefer and not religion—under either name it will be equally worthy of our study.”15 
 Because of this, it is useful to subsume James’ subject matter in Varieties under a larger 
category or genus of which “religious experience” will be but one species. This larger category, 
as Sonu Shamdasani says, can be labeled “states of transformation” some of which can be 
interpreted as religious.
16
 Just what is being transformed, however? This paper contends that 
such states involve the breakdown of the Cartesian self. This breakdown of the Cartesian, 
reflective self can happen in several ways. Two of these ways will be discussed here. First, 
consciousness can empty itself of all contents (and experience what Robert Forman refers to as a 
“pure conscious event” or PCE17). As will be argued below, such an event can be understood 
through a Merleau-Pontean lens: in such states, the “tacit cogito” experiences itself qua 
consciousness. On the other hand, this breaking of the Cartesian self can occur through a new 
kind of reflective self or identity, a new kind of conscious life, coming to awareness. Such states 
                                                          
14
 Ibid. p. 44 
15
 Ibid. p. 41 
16
 Shamdasani, Sonu. “Psychologies as Ontology-making Practices: William James and the Pluralities of 
Psychological Experience.” William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration.  
Ed. Jeremy Carrette. New York: Routledge. 2005.  
17
 Forman, Robert K. C. Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.  
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are marked by an opening to alterity, a melting of the ordinary self into a larger self, the 
Cartesian self (hermetically sealed, non-bodily) being subsumed or sacrificed. Interpreted with a 
Jamesian lens, such states can be explained (though not explained away) by James’ idea that the 
unconscious, serving as a possible gateway to other realities, harbors several distinct, non-
ordinary selves that may be able to interact with said realities. All of this will be explored further 
below. First, let’s look at some of these latter forms of states of transformation.  
The recording of such losses of self, of course, is very old. For example, E.R. Dodds 
points out such openings of the contained self in Homer. For example, “ate is a state of mind—a 
temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness. It is, in fact, a partial and 
temporary insanity; and, like all insanity, it is ascribed, not to physiological or psychological 
causes, but to an external ‘daemonic’ agency.”18 Another example of such ‘psychic 
interventions’ is when a god imbues a warrior with power or energy. That is, when a god creates 
a certain state of mind where an abundance of excess strength flows out of the warrior. As Dodd 
points out, such strength is attributed to a foreign (and often supernatural) agent: “…all 
departures from normal human behavior whose causes are not immediately perceived, whether 
by the subjects’ own consciousness or by the observation of others, are ascribed to a supernatural 
agency…”19 Finally, when someone has a particularly brilliant (or a particularly foolish) idea, 
the latter is said to have been put into him by something outside of himself. “When [the 
individual] acts in a manner contrary to the system of conscious dispositions which he is said to 
‘know,’ his action is not properly his own, but has been dictated to him. In other words, 
unsystematised, nonrational impulses, and the acts resulting from them, tend to be excluded from 
                                                          
18
 Dodds, E.R. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkley: University of California Press, 1968.  
19
 Ibid. p. 13 
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the self and ascribed to some alien origin.”20 Strikingly, such descriptions are quite similar to 
James’ analysis of the experience and evolution of the Greek gods: “It is as if there were in the 
human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling  of objective presence, a perception of what we 
may call ‘something there,’ more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 
‘senses’ by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be revealed.”21 
 Of course, in the ancient world there were other, more ritualistic experiences of such 
states. The various mystery cults allowed their votaries to see their respective gods face to face, 
as it were. According to Hugh Bowden, such rituals do not fit into the anthropological category 
of “doctrinal” modes of experiencing or understanding the divine.22 This mode is characterized 
by sacred scripture and frequent, low-intensity religious experience. The Catholic Church, with 
its Holy Bible and weekly Mass, for example, is a good representation of this mode of religious 
experience. A different way of understanding and experiencing the divine, however, is 
represented by the “imagistic” mode. The latter is characterized by high-intensity, infrequent 
religious experience. Such high-intensity experiences characterize the mystery cults.  
“What [the mystery cults] had in common is that they usually took place at night, and in secret. They were 
carried out by or for individuals or groups. They were, as far as we can tell, frightening and disorienting, involving 
rapid movement between darkness and bright light, with loud music and other noise. Participants may have been 
blindfolded, and probably little if anything of what they experience would have been explained.” 
                                                          
20
 Ibid.  p.17 
21
 Ibid. p. 61 
22
 Bowden, Hugh. Mystery Cults of the Ancient World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. p.15 
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Such rituals were “…designed to disorientate the initiate by overwhelming their sight and 
hearing, and possibly other senses...”23 Often disorienting and at times very frightening, such 
experiences are “burned into the mind” of the initiates. 
 As is well-known, the Dionysus cult was one prominent example of such mystery cults. 
This god is associated with wild states of transformation.  
“The link between Dionysus and uncontrolled behavior is not difficult to understand. He is the god of wine, 
and wine breaks down restraint, leading to wild uncontrollable actions. One of Dionysus’s titles in Athens was 
Eleutherios, ‘the liberator’, and this is taken to refer, among other things, to the effect of wine… 
“Dionysus was also associated with masks…The purpose of the mask is to hide the identity of the person 
wearing it, so Dionysus is normally seen in disguise…Bacchic rites give bacchants the opportunity to see the god 
without his mask. To do this they abandoned the trappings of civilization, represented by hearth and house and 
woolen clothes, and went out into the wild landscape beyond the city and beyond cultivated land around it, up into 
the uncultivated mountains and hills, dressed in animal skins. This journey would have been disorienting in itself. 
Once there they would sing and dance wildly, actions usually associated with ecstatic cults, and seek to achieve a 
trance state in which they might meet Dionysus unmasked.”24 
 As this description of the ritual indicates, the disappearance of the ordinary self into the 
ecstatic where the god can be seen unmasked is intricately bound with the disappearance of 
socially-constituted individual. The rites take place in the uncultivated mountainside and the 
participants are dressed in animal skins as they sing and dance. Thus, “One way of explaining 
[this]…is that [the participants] are transported from civilization to wildness, both in location and 
in behavior.”25  
                                                          
23
 Ibid. p. 215 
24
 Ibid. p. 134-6 
25
 Ibid. p. 123 
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 To say that the participants are transported from civilization to the wilderness or that the 
socially-constructed individual disappears completely, however, would be misleading. This is so 
since, qua ritualized, in these states the participants of the Bacchic cult, for example, came into 
contact with Dionysus. The participants of the Eleusinian Mysteries, on the other hand, would 
have come into contact with Demeter and Persephone. Thus, although these rites take place 
“outside” of civilization, the mental states associated with these rites are still mediated, indeed, 
saturated, by cultural interpretation. Thus, in interpreting these states, we need to follow the 
constructivists: experience, including experiences in altered states, is constructed by language 
and culture.
26
 
How do we explain the emergence of these new selves? In the Varieties, James concerns 
himself with what he takes to be a psychological discovery of supreme importance that had 
recently been uncovered. This was the discovery of the unconscious. James was following the 
recent work of Myers who concluded thus 
“I suggest, then, that the stream of consciousness in which we habitually live is not the only consciousness 
which exists in connection with our organism. Our habitual or empirical consciousness may consist of a mere 
selection from a multitude of thoughts and sensations, of which some at least are equally conscious with those that 
we empirically know. I accord no primacy to my ordinary waking self, except that among my potential selves this 
one has shown itself the fittest to meet the needs of common life. I hold that it has established no further claim, and 
that it is perfectly possible that other thoughts, feelings, and memories, either isolated or in continuous connection, 
                                                          
26
 It should be pointed out that the conclusion that cultural categories still play a large role in altered states does not 
follow merely from the fact that those initiates of the Bacchic rites came into contact with Dionysus while those of 
the Eleusinian mysteries came into contact with Persephone or Demeter. This only follows if we assume a post-
Kantian epistemology where cultural categories are superimposed on a singular, unknowable reality and that, in case 
of religious experience, there is only one such reality. That is, this conclusion follows from an implicit monotheism. 
However, if we adopt a polytheistic stance (the kind of stance to which such initiates were committed) then it could 
be the case that no cultural categories come into play: the reason the respective members are coming into contact 
with different gods is because there are multiple gods with whom it is possible to come into contact! Though the 
polytheistic interpretation is possible, I do not find it compelling (though I cannot argue for that here) and continue 
to assume an implicit monotheism.  
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may now be actively conscious, as we say, ‘within me’,--in some kind of co-ordination with my organism, and 
forming some part of my total individuality.”27 
This has important consequences since, as the historian of religion Ann Taves notes,  
“By placing the pathological, the normal, and the potentially supranormal within a common frame of 
reference, Myers created a theoretical space (the subliminal) through which influences beyond the individual, should 
they exist, might be expected to manifest themselves. In explaining spirit possession as a ‘shifting of the psychical 
center of energy within the personality of the automatist himself’ without ruling out ‘the possibility that some 
influence external to the [automatist] may at times be operative,’ Myers modeled the open-ended approach to 
explanation that James later adopted in Varieties.” 28  
Therefore, by the time the Gifford Lectures came around, James had adopted the view 
that multiple selves are latent within the individual and that such selves could be released, that 
such selves could be brought to conscious awareness. This is a clear departure from Descartes’ 
conception of subjectivity. Indeed, for Descartes, consciousness is equated with self-
consciousness or self-awareness of a single substance. Thus, not only does Descartes appear to 
ignore everyday, pre-reflective awareness that the phenomenologists describe so well; he also 
has no conception of an unconscious that influences the cogito, nor would he be able to even 
fathom the idea that this unconscious harbors multiple, alternative selves. Further, for James 
these multiple selves are not seen as necessarily constructs of the unconscious, mere creations of 
the mind that is closed to itself. This mind is not sealed off from the world and others. In fact, as 
noted above, James suggests the possibility that the unconscious could be the doorway through 
which the other (including the religious other) makes itself known.  
                                                          
27
 Quoted in Taves, Ann. “The Fragmentation of Consciousness and The Varieties of Religious Experience: William 
James’ Contribution to a Theory of Religion.”  William James and the Science of Religions. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004.  
28
 Ibid. p. 61 
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“Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side, the ‘more’ with which 
in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation of our 
conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 
‘science’ which the ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian’s contention that the religious man is 
moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region 
to take an objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control. In the religious life the control is 
felt as ‘higher’; but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the faculties of our own hidden mind which are 
controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally 
true.”29 
He also says 
“But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material, 
so it is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological 
condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to 
them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which in the dreamy subliminal might remain ajar or open. 
Thus that perception of external control which is so essential a feature in conversion might, in some cases 
at any rate, be interpreted as the orthodox interpret it: forces transcending the finite individual might impress him, on 
condition of his being what we may call a subliminal human specimen.”30 
Although James remains agnostic about whether or not on the farther side God/gods/the 
Ultimate can be found, he leaves the possibility open that the subconscious ends not with one’s 
own mind, but with something ‘higher’. In this way, in going beyond Descartes’ self, James 
offers the possibility to go “backwards”, viz. to Augustine’s self where ipseity is open to alterity, 
even to divine alterity.  
                                                          
29
 James, p. 386-7 
30
 Ibid. p. 195   
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“For what Augustine discovered by going ‘inside’, into his innermost self, was nothing other than 
Otherness itself: the truth (the presence) of that which is most real, the reality (presence) of other (human) selves 
and, above all, the reality of that supremely Other Self, that Alter Ego which is ‘more me than me myself,’ the ens 
realissimum, God. The Supremely Other (le Tout Autre) is discovered in the innermost reaches of the presence of 
the self to itself: it is, quite simply, intimior intimo meo (‘deeper than my inmost understanding’).”31 
 So, James believed there were multiple selves within a single organism. Many of these 
selves were kept below the level of conscious awareness. This has interesting possibilities when 
it comes to connecting Merleau-Ponty’s with James’ thought. Although Merleau-Ponty does not 
explicitly deal with a conception of unconscious selves, his theory could help explain their 
existence because   
“The new theory [i.e. Myer’s], in effect, postulated that chains of bodily memories, if sufficiently extensive and 
elaborate, could in turn constitute distinct selves or personalities. These dissociated memory chains, which could be 
tapped and extended by means of hypnosis and automatic writing, offered a theoretical model whereby two ‘selves’ 
could coexist in one body.”32 
This is a Merleau-Pontean way of seeing the creation of these different reflective self. 
Based on bodily memories, new selves could be formed. As the tacit cogito’s ordinary 
relationship with the world founds “ordinary waking consciousness,” different kinds of bodily 
movements or actions (for example, in dancing when the body’s motility is fully extended, in 
fasting, in self-mutilation) could constitute different selves. It is important to point out, however, 
that Merleau-Ponty’s tacit cogito is not the same thing as James’ conception of the 
subconscious. The tacit cogito is the ground upon which all reflective selves grow; it is 
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consciousness as such. So, because the tacit cogito is at the heart of self formation at the 
reflective level, one could interpret these reflective selves as merely epiphenomena rooted in, 
and ultimately reduced to, the tacit cogito (that is, reduced to the subject side, as it were, of the 
body-subject’s relationship with the world). If this is the case, a reductionist, naturalistic reading 
of other selves, as opposed James’ openness to an external agency, is suggested. Therefore, we 
appear to reach an impasse between these two thinkers. We will return to this impasse below.  
To return to states of transformation, since the ancient mystery cults were religious cults 
(that is, concerned with the traditional gods of the city-state and, many times, concerned with an 
afterlife), the experience was interpreted as religious. Clearly, however, such overtly religious 
contexts can be absent when states of transformation are experienced. Indeed, Bowden himself 
points to the similarities between the experiences that were induced in these cults and modern 
rave culture. Both are characterized by loud, rhythmic, repetitive music as well as visual and 
other sensory disorientation.  
“Techno music, stretched across high-frequency oscillations, waves, bleeps and low-end incessant thumping, also 
modulates consciousness in a specific fashion. Techno proves to be a truly efficient sculptor and architect of time, 
while space becomes thick or aerial in accordance. Through its insistent and repetitive beat structure, techno 
constantly reiterates a present, a new foundation, a Nietzschean eternal differential return, a new event of meaning—
as though it were some sort of relentless immediacy machine.”33 
Many ravers have experienced the loss of their ordinary self, a sense of oneness or of 
eternity, while raving. Like the ritualized contexts before them, such raves offer a place where 
loud, repetitive, experimental music is played; dancing is prevalent; and psychotropic substances 
are often used. Indeed François Gauthier believes that the popularity of rave culture is due to its 
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religious nature. This claim needs to be analyzed since, as James reminds us, the words 
“religion” and “religious” are highly ambiguous. First, Gauthier needs to explain what he means 
by “religious nature.” James has already shown that terms like “religion” are highly ambiguous 
and open to many meanings. Surely Gauthier does not mean that all ravers are part of a 
particular religious organization and believe that raving produces a homogenous experience that 
gets them into contact with their respective God or Ultimate. Although using the word 
“religious” in this case would be uncontroversial, it is clearly inapplicable to the rave experience 
(there is no universal religious affiliation among ravers, nor is there a homogenous experience, 
not to mention a homogenous religious experience). If, therefore, Gauthier means that such 
imagistic experiences can be interpreted as religious in the sense that some ravers may interpret 
their experience as having religious import and interpret said experience with their 
culturally/religiously-inherited language and traditional theological presuppositions, then this is 
surely plausible. Also plausible, however, is the idea that some of the participants will break 
from traditional theological interpretations and perhaps even traditional religious language. Such 
individuals create their own “religious” language in order to think about and describe their 
experience. The fact that language is needed both to describe and to understand such experiences 
reminds us of an important point, however: thinking about such experiences, even from the first-
person perspective, requires interpretation and is thus created by the cultural forces (among them 
political and social) that shape language. As Grace Jantzen remind us, experience is embedded in 
a cultural and political context.
34
 This is not to say, if one were to come into contact with a 
divine other, that this other can be reduced to a cultural construct; it simply says that in order to 
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think about this other, the other’s presence must be interpreted. We have seen this above in the 
case of the mystery cults: the bacchants encounter Dionysus while the initiates of the Eleusinian 
Mysteries encounter Demeter or Persephone. James concurs that this constructivist aspect of 
non-ordinary experiences is often necessary. “The monarchical type of sovereignty was, for 
example, so ineradicably planted in the mind of our forefathers that a dose of cruelty and 
arbitrariness in their deity seems positively to have been required by their imagination. They 
called the cruelty ‘retributive justice’ and a God without it would certainly have struck them as 
not ‘sovereign’ enough.”35 For James, “The gods we stand by are the gods we need and can use, 
the gods whose demands on us are reinforcements of our demands on ourselves and on one 
another.”36 Here we see, and briefly set aside for later, the connection between pragmatism and 
constructivism.  
James adopts a constructivist position when it comes to interpreting these experiences. In 
many ways, such a position is largely unavoidable. After all, how can one think of one’s 
experience without thought which is conditioned by language? However, Robert Forman has 
argued for the existence of at least some type of mystical experiences, what he calls the “pure 
conscious event” or PCE, where inherited cultural categories and even language are 
transcended.
37
 In such states, characteristic of Buddhist and Advaita Vedantist meditation, 
consciousness simply experiences itself. James Landau agrees that PCEs are possible and has 
argued that, because mystics and ravers alike speak of the ineffability of the experience, there 
may be room for a ‘pure experience of ecstasy.’  
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“A state ‘beyond’ language, ecstasy opens up a breech, an epistemological gap, between itself and its 
subsequent discursive products. Because of this, all testimonials and other experiential accounts must be seen as 
retroactive renderings, as attempts after the fact (perhaps mere seconds after the fact) to make sense of, to 
conceptualize, what is inherently ineffable: a desubjectified cognitive state that can best be understood as a corporeal 
style of being, i.e. a non-reflective awareness autonomous in its ‘freedom’ from ideology, language and culture. An 
‘experience’ only after the fact, ecstasy is opposed to rationality and higher-order thought. Ultimately, it is indeed 
the ‘transcendence’ of the thematic, Cartesian cogito, albeit in a manner distinct from the idealistic formulations of 
traditional religion.”38 
Although language is needed to think about the experience afterwards, there may be “an 
epistemological gap” that allows for pure experience. In this state, different discursive selves are 
not experienced. Instead, what can be characterized as a return to the tacit cogito, before 
reflection, is effectuated. This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s claim that  
“…language presupposes nothing less than a consciousness of language, a silence of consciousness 
embracing the world of speech in which words first receive a form and meaning. This is why consciousness is never 
subordinated to any empirical language, why languages can be translated and learned, and finally, why language is 
not an attribute of external origin, in the sociologist’s sense. Behind the spoken cogito, the one which is converted 
into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a tacit cogito, myself experienced by myself.”39 
In returning to the tacit cogito, the subject goes beyond language (if only for a short 
while). Merleau-Ponty would concede that, in such experiences as rave and certainly in ritualistic 
settings in which the self is offered as a sacrifice an experience of the tacit cogito is possible. 
“The tacit cogito, the presence of oneself to oneself, being no less than existence, is anterior to 
any philosophy, and knows itself only in those extreme situations in which it is under threat: for 
                                                          
38
 Landau, James. “The Flesh of Raving : Merleau-Ponty and the ‘experience’ of ecstasy.” Rave Culture and 
Religion. New York: Routledge, 2004. p. 113 
39
 Merleau-Ponty, p. 469 
  
 
20 
 
example, in the dread of death…”40 In the fête, when the everyday self is given up, that is “in the 
dread of death”, the tacit cogito could be experienced.  
And yet, as has been conceded, in order to communicate such experiences (even to think 
about them oneself), language is needed. In this way, even PCEs will always be constructed, at 
least to some degree, after the fact. Thus, both PCEs and trance-states will have to be interpreted. 
Although, as James says, such experiences (and their interpretations) are authoritative for the one 
who has experienced them, others need not accept, and may have to look for external support for 
the truth of any particular experience/interpretation. What would this external support be? Here, 
James again offers help. Such external support is grounded in pragmatic considerations: 
outsiders must determine the value of any of these states (and/or of their subsequent 
interpretation) by the ‘fruits of the soul’ that they produce.  
“Our spiritual judgment, I said, our opinion of the significance and value of  a human event or condition, must be 
decided on empirical grounds exclusively. If the fruits for life of the state of conversion are good, we ought to 
idealize and venerate it, even though it be a piece of natural psychology; if not, we ought to make short work with it, 
no matter what supernatural being may have infused it.”41 
Therefore, if more altruistic individuals are generated from these mystical experiences, outsiders 
can judge them to be valuable. In fact, James says that even if there is an external source that is 
inducing certain mystical states but that do not generate fruits of the soul, then “we ought to 
make short work with [them].”42 
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IV. The Flesh of the World: Alterity at the Heart of Ipseity  
 
A. Later Thoughts  
As we have seen, the early Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the tacit cogito provides us with a 
reductionistic theoretical framework with which to examine these states. However, as his thought 
matured into his late ontology, as Merleau-Ponty began to dig deeper into the miracle of 
perception  itself, the tacit cogito becomes subsumed into what he calls the flesh of the world.  
“…the ‘there is,’ sensation, must…be thought of as an ontological function, as an ‘attribute’ of Being. The 
sensing-sensible chiasm which constitutes sensible consciousness is a paradox, Merleau-Ponty says, not of man but 
of Being. The ‘there is’ thus belongs to Being, to the flesh, and not to man. The essence of man as a sensible 
consciousness is precisely to be the ‘there is’ of Being. It is not to man that Presence, sensible consciousness, 
belongs; it is, on the contrary, Presence which possesses man.”43 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of oneself and the other, both as “invisible” consciousnesses 
perceiving the world, as being part of the same l’etre sauvage or wild being; that is, as being part 
of the same flesh of the world. In this way, there is a fundamental continuity between the world, 
the other, and oneself. Indeed, sometimes the borders between these different variations of this 
Being are not very clear.  
“What the flesh ‘means’ is that, when I engage in reflection, I am already for myself an other. Because of 
this, otherness is inscribed in my very flesh. It is precisely because the flesh, which introduces otherness into me, is 
also ‘my’ flesh that there are for me alter egos, other myselves, such that I am always for myself the other of the 
other of me. The other, in order to be for me, does not have to ‘encroach’ on me; when I begin to reflect, he or she is 
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already ‘in’ me, as a constitutive dimension of my flesh. I do not ‘project’ the other; the other is what I discover 
when, in moments of reflexivity, I seek to lay hold of myself.”44 
The malleability of the principium individuationis within the flesh is best expressed through 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of reversibility. What is this? For Merleau-Ponty, one is able to perceive 
the world because one is a perceivable entity. One is able to bump into things because one is also 
a being that is solid and that can serve as an impediment to others’ movement. The most famous 
articulation of this principle of reversibility is the example of the two hands. 
“There is a relation of my body to itself that makes it the vinculum of the self and things. When my right hand 
touches my left, I am aware of it as a ‘physical thing.’ But at the same moment, if I wish, an extraordinary event 
takes place: here is my left hand as well starting to perceive my right…Thus I touch myself touching; my body 
accomplishes ‘a sort of reflection.’ In it, through it, there is not just the unidirectional relationship of the one who 
perceives to what he perceives. The relationship is reversible, the touched hand becomes the touching hand, and I 
am obliged to say…that the body is a ‘perceiving thing,’ a ‘subject-object.’”45 
 In this case, the caressing and the caressed are one body. However, Merleau-Ponty claims 
that in this situation, one can only be in one mode at a given time. That is to say, one can either 
focus on being the caresser in which case one is active and reaching out to the world, or one can 
focus on being the caressed in which one is passive and being acted upon. This example gets 
extended beyond the human body, however, and represents the reversibility of all things. This 
reversibility points out another fundamental feature of the flesh: the notion of écart. Even within 
this uniform flesh of the world, what was earlier characterized as one’s point of view, one’s own 
“invisible” consciousness, is still present. As the hand example shows, there is a fundamental 
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gap that is always present between things. One cannot both be the hand caressing and the hand 
caressed at the same time.  
“It is time to emphasize that it is a reversibility always imminent and never realized in fact. My left hand is 
always on the verge of touching my right hand touching the things, but I never reach coincidence; the coincidence 
eclipses at the moment of realization, and one of two things always occurs: either my right hand really passes over to 
the rank of touched, but then its hold on the world is interrupted; or it retains its hold on the world, but then I do not 
really touch it—my right hand touching, I palpate with my left hand only its outer covering.”46 
B. Art’s Role: Painting and Phenomenology; Music and the Ecstatic  
i. Eye and Mind 
Merleau-Ponty stresses the importance of painting in many of his writings. This is 
because of the painter’s ability to examine the phenomenal field. It is only when one really 
examines what one sees that objects appear in their full richness. It is when one notices the lines, 
the shadows, the depth, etc. that one recognizes how objects present themselves. These hidden or 
“invisible” aspects of the world are fundamental to one’s perception of physical objects. For 
example, it is precisely the shadows painted on the canvas that make Rembrandt’s The Night 
Watch so convincing. As Merleau-Ponty puts it 
“We see that the hand pointing towards us in The Night Watch is truly there only when we see that its 
shadow on the captain’s body presents it simultaneously in profile…Everyone with eyes has at some point or other 
witnessed this play of shadows, or something like it, and has been made by it to see things and a space. But it 
worked in them without them; it hid to make the object visible. To see the object, it is necessary not to see the play 
of light and shadows around it.”47  
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These invisible aspects, then, are what allow one to see objects in the first place. They 
bring the visible forth and do so by remaining largely undetected themselves. As Merleau-Ponty 
suggests, this interplay between the visible and the invisible is not merely a painter’s trick. The 
painting is so convincing because of its faithfulness to one’s perception of the world. By 
recognizing and bringing out these overlooked aspects of the phenomenal field, the painter is 
able to elucidate one’s lived experience. This, however, does not mean that Merleau-Ponty 
favors mimesis, as it is traditionally understood, above all else. Indeed, although he thinks art can 
aid the phenomenological project, he thinks that modern art is more geared to the task than 
classical or Renaissance art.
48
  His fixation on Cézanne is indicative of this. If one thinks of 
Cézanne’s paintings one recognizes that what one perceives often needs to be expressed through 
what mimetic artists would consider to be exaggeration or manipulation. Monet’s lilies, Renoir’s 
cafés and déjeuners, Van Gogh’s skies, all refer to one’s experience in a unique, non-traditional 
way. That is, it refers to them in a way one is unfamiliar with in painting, but also that one 
recognizes as phenomenologically valid or true.  
Yet, in Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty does not just focus on the enjoyment of paintings. 
Instead, he thinks that an analysis of the painter and his craft can illustrate and confirm some of 
his later ideas. This is particularly true of his concept of the flesh of the world. The artist is able 
to see, and thus to paint, because his eye is of the same material as the world; they are of the 
same flesh. As Merleau-Ponty points out at the beginning of section 2 of his essay, “…we cannot 
imagine how a mind could paint. It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the 
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world into painting .”49 Again, the body that creates these “transubstantiations”, of course, is not 
the body as the biologist explains it, but the lived body, the “intertwining of vision and 
movement .”50  So, the reason the eye can “take in” objects is because of a fundamental 
connection between the eye and the world. Although there is always an écart or gap between the 
painter and the painted (that is, there is always a recognition that what one is painting is separate 
from one’s body), there is also a reversibility; there is always a folding over of the perceived and 
the perceiver. The body both sees and is seen. It is a thing “caught in the fabric of the world,”51 
but it also moves through things and is able to perceive them; it can do this not because the eye is 
a receptor of light and can send information to the brain for processing. It can do this because the 
body is a particular incarnation within an incarnate world. Because of this, the artist can become 
incorporated into the painted itself; the painted can stare back at the painter. 
ii. Phenomenological Analysis of Music  
So, the value of the phenomenological analysis of both the enjoyment of painting and the 
painter at work is clear. What about, to begin with, the enjoyment of music? What would a 
phenomenological analysis of this reveal and how can it further the study of states of 
transformation in particular? Most importantly, I think, such an analysis would have to bring out 
the magical properties of this phenomenon. What does “magical” imply? First, it refers to the 
remarkable way in which music can alter the phenomenal field or, in Merleau-Ponty’s later 
terminology, its ability to provide a new (and predominant) layer of flesh to the world. To see 
this, consider the following passage from Eye and Mind.   
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“When through the water’s thickness I see the tiled bottom of the pool, I do not see it despite the water and 
the reflections; I see it through them and because of them. If there were no distortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it 
were without that flesh that I saw the geometry of the tiles, then I would cease to see it as it is and where it is—
which is to say, beyond any identical, specific place. I cannot say that the water itself—the aqueous power, the 
syrupy and shimmering element—is in space; all this is not somewhere else either, but it is not in the pool. It 
inhabits it, is materialized there, yet it is not contained there; and if I lift my eyes toward the screen of cypresses 
where the web of reflection plays, I must recognize that the water visits it as well, or at least sends out to it its active 
essence, living essence.”52 
So, the water, as an aqueous power, becomes the most salient part of the flesh of the 
world in this situation. It stretches over everything and changes the objects as it does so. This 
characteristic of the flesh is important for understanding music’s ability to reshape the 
phenomenal field. Imagine walking outside while wearing headphones. In this situation, the 
music monopolizes the ears and forces the world to become unified in a peculiar way: the objects 
seem to revolve around the music. That is, their movements are perceived only in relation to the 
piece being enjoyed: the trees sway with the rhythm; the cars cruise by as if the legato of the 
strings were the energy behind the locomotion; the loud, unexpected accents transform a serene 
park into a chaotic, unsettling place. Even the recalcitrant objects, those that do not seem in 
accord with the music by going against the beats, for example, are seen as rebellious. Just like 
the water, this aqueous power, creates a new “layer” of flesh in which other objects are 
perceived, the music, this sonorous power, creates new contours in the flesh of the world. Its 
overflow extends, however, far beyond the reflections of the pool on the cypresses; it extends 
everywhere. Indeed, it would be more correct to say that there is no “overflow”; the whole of the 
music extends everywhere equally. This is an important point for understanding music’s ability 
to change ordinary perception and to induce states of transformation. As Ruth Herbert has 
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argued, absorption and dissociation are common even in everyday enjoyment of music. Writing 
about an experience of one of her test subjects, Herbert says 
“Sophie describes a familiar practice of choreographing her surroundings with music, in which music 
blends with environment so as to elicit a selective external awareness…and an enhanced visual sense as music 
blends with environment…Music appears to unify and make extraordinary an experience that would otherwise be 
ordinary (my emphasis).”53 
Music can “…make extraordinary an experience that would otherwise be ordinary.” It 
can completely restructure an experience. Thus, there is no wonder that music is often associated 
with contexts, whether Dionysian revelries or modern raves, that facilitate the reshaping or 
sacrifice of the ordinary self. Music in such contexts helps to reorient the body’s everyday 
relationship with the world. This relationship is transformed into something uncommon or 
unfamiliar and, in turn, phenomenal experience becomes extraordinary.  
Music can alter, through substitution, the natural unity of the world. One can see this 
more clearly when it is incorporated into another art form, viz. film. At the end of Stanley 
Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, one sees a 
series of images, each showing an atomic bomb detonating with a mushroom cloud slowly 
stretching overhead. Some shots are very close to the detonation site, others are relatively 
removed. Not only is the verisimilitude removed, but the natural emotional or psychological 
response is suppressed by what is happening on the soundtrack: as the images pass by, an old-
time pop song is playing ( lyrics: “we’ll meet again/don’t know where/don’t know when!”), 
fundamentally changing one’s experience of the horrific event. The sound of the massive object 
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falling through the air; the roar (or silence, depending on where one is) of the explosion; in a 
sentence, everything that would make the object real, that would make the horror fully present, is 
removed. Instead, this pop song colors the images, forcing a restructuring of ordinary experience, 
and therefore forcing the viewer to rethink her understanding of the phenomenon on the screen. 
Indeed, this constitutes the artistic merit of the scenes. Or take scenes from the same director’s 
2001: A Space Odyssey. The very first images of space are accompanied by Johann Strauss’ 
Waltz. With this accompaniment, the spacecraft one sees appears to float with the ¾ time 
signature, as if dancing. The movement appears light, coordinated, and cheerful. This is clearly a 
result of the music’s spell. If the soundtrack were turned off, if verisimilitude were maintained, 
the same images would be fundamentally transformed. The spacecraft, previously so full of life, 
would transform into mere vessels, mere machines, floating through dead space. For another 
famous example, consider the torture scene from Tarantino’s Reservoir Dogs. Obviously 
influenced by Kubrick’s techniques, this scene juxtaposes a horrific spectacle of torture with the 
bubblegum sounds of Steely Dan’s “Stuck in the Middle with You.” This presentation of the 
scene evokes a grotesque response from the viewer as one struggles to reorient oneself.  Finally, 
consider Godard’s use of music in some of his early films. In particular scenes, the music will 
abruptly come on the soundtrack (almost as if the editing had been poorly done) changing the 
viewer’s experience of the scene; but it will just as abruptly disappear from the soundtrack 
allowing the natural sounds to reemerge, only to reappear (and again disappear) in staccato 
fashion. All of this fundamentally shapes the viewer’s experience of the films.  
  In Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty points out that synesthetic experiences 
are much more common than is ordinarily recognized; indeed, he even says that “Synaesthetic 
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perception is the rule…”54 Hues of color have specific sounds that resonate from them. Words 
and letters invoke seemingly unrelated images. Whether or not these experiences are as frequent 
as Merleau-Ponty claims, the power of music in going at least some way to confirm this claim 
should be recognized. With eyes closed, the soft, oneiric sounds of Chopin’s Nocturnes, for 
example, seem to float over one’s skin ever so gently. Or, the objects surrounding one, perhaps 
once seen as vibrant, suddenly become somber or bluish in hue, as the sounds of Radiohead’s 
Kid A wash over them. “It is as if one could sometimes see the occasional collapse of the barriers 
established…between the senses.”55 The power of music in this respect is fascinating and, once 
recognized, also plays an elucidatory function: it reveals the importance of sound in our 
experience of the world. Just as painting shows us the necessary yet invisible aspects of our 
world, so too can music show us the silent (as it were) aspects of our world. The sound of wind is 
essential to the reality of the breeze on the beach. The crashing of the waves not only expresses 
the power, the force, of the water before me; it is this power (it is an essential feature of it). This 
sound is not an afterthought, a mere emission of something physical (i.e. sound-waves).  It is 
part of the waves; it is the waves themselves. Further, this sound brings forth a synesthetic 
experience. One can feel (tactilely) the splashing of the waves on one’s face with these sounds. It 
is music’s ability to alter these sounds, to block them out and to set up new ones, that makes the 
world appear so strange, so new; and correspondingly, it can show one how “ordinary” sounds 
are an essential part of the world as one lives it. 
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Thus, music can bring about profound shifts in the phenomenal field or in the layers of 
the flesh of the world. So far, however, music’s effects on the body’s motility haven’t been 
analyzed. This is an important feature of music’s phenomenology. The first thing to recognize is 
that the lived body incorporates music into itself. It does this because music beckons the body. 
Here is another magical aspect of music: it acts as an incantation. The rhythm of the music calls 
the body to sway with it; to move in accord with it. Just as the object being painted calls 
something within the painter (that is, effectuates a renversement—the trees stare back at the 
painter), music touches something within the body and the body responds to the music through 
movements: taps of the feet, bobbing of the head, or full-fledged dance. The latter, where the 
entire body responds to the music, is the fullest expression of the body’s responsiveness to the 
art, to this uncanny force. Unlike in ordinary engagement with the world, the dancer does not 
move in order to appropriate, to manipulate, or to explore objects. Instead, music beckons the 
body to express its potential, its power, its capacity to move. It beckons the body to express pure 
motility. Conscious thought, as exemplified through the Cartesian cogito, is removed; the bodily 
movements express that primordial connection to the world that permeates all of one’s 
interactions with the world. Not for manipulation; not by necessity. Instead, the dance is taken up 
for expression; to express the joy of motility. When this is done, strange things happen on the 
reflective level.  
 “We all hold hands and breathe together in unison. With eyes closed we centre ourselves, focusing our 
concentration directly on the present…One deep breath and then it begins…Within every moment of this dance is a 
piece of me. I am dancing Laita and Laita is dancing me. I enter the stage, embraced by the energy of the dance 
washing across the space. It moves through me and carries me, becoming more and more intense as the pace of the 
piece continues to speed up. My body is moving without instruction, for the movements are so ingrained they are 
known on a cellular level. This frees me to become one with the dance…An overwhelming sense of joy engulfs my 
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body. It begins at my centre and spreads upward, downward, forward, and backward until every last molecule of my 
self is saturated…Time has stopped functioning in its normal fashion.”56 
In this fête, the self is offered as sacrifice.
57
 The dancer participates “…in an inflated 
social body and, both intimately and ultimately, the recognition of the need for others.”58 The 
Cartesian self is dissolved into something greater. James Landau warns us, however, of going too 
far with this “rhetoric of unity.” He writes 
“Ravers, even as their egos melt, even as their bodies dissolve into a larger ‘organism’, still speak of 
something apart, of some undefinable ‘thing’ distinct from the crowd. Ask them if they completely disappear into 
this unity while ecstatic, and they will often vacillate, equivocally answering both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ as they search for 
the terminology to describe, to produce, their ‘experience’.59  
Thus, there is a reversibility, a melting of individuals,  but also an écart. This is an 
important point that will return in Section II, part iii.  
The lived body tends towards regularity; towards familiar, sedimented movements. Music 
can change this. It can act as an educator, forcing the body to adopt new habits of movements. 
This is especially true of unfamiliar music. Strange rhythms, odd-time signatures, etc. all force 
the body into new movements, as it tries to follow this lovely pedagogue.
60
 At times, one can try 
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to put one’s movements in accord with the rhythm or the time-signature of the piece, yet the 
body, due to unfamiliarity, seems gauche. It is necessary to incorporate new habits of movement 
to synchronize with these sounds (a drummer, for example, needs to incorporate different time-
signatures into his arsenal of movements). This unfamiliarity, these foreign sounds already 
endowed with a transcendence (the motility of the other), reminds the listener of the 
intersubjective world. For one sees, at live performances, the bodies on the stage, those structures 
that are so like one’s own, move in such a way that produces these new sounds. That is, their 
bodies have encompassed, through habit, these new rhythms, for example, and demonstrate a 
new possibility to one’s own body. Indeed, one need not even look at the bodies on stage to 
know this: the music itself is the expression or, rather, an extension of the body of the performer.  
What does this mean? It means that the music that is beckoning one is nothing but the beckoning 
or demands of the other’s body. Through the air, across the space that separates you, the other 
can still touch one. Dance, like language or Sartre’s Look, is a phenomenological refutation of 
solipsism. This is all well and good, someone may object, yet it doesn’t get us that far; after all, 
the existence of other minds was never a problem for Merleau-Ponty. What is of more interest is 
what this tells us about the nature of one’s relationship with the other. The ontological problem 
of alterity needs to be addressed: What are the essential features of this relationship? What are 
the necessary limitations on one’s relations with others? It is to these questions that I now turn. 
In examining the relationship between individual band members as they are playing music, 
surprising intersubjective possibilities arise.  
iii. Considerations on Musical Performance and Alterity  
Let us consider the interaction between the members of those bands that favor 
improvisation. For example, many “jambands” cut from the same cloth as the Grateful Dead use 
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songs as skeletal structures in which long, improvised “jamming” can take place. A three-minute 
song can last up to thirty-minutes with these bands. This paper is not going to defend (nor attack) 
the value of such an aesthetic. Instead, I want to examine the phenomenology of what goes on in 
these longs “jams”. If the reader has ever played music with a band, especially improvisational 
music, she will know that, at the best of times, the musician’s performance ceases to be a 
conscious action. Instead, it turns into a trance-like experience. One no longer chooses to play 
specific notes, to create certain rhythms, certain sounds. Indeed, the body simply produces them 
according to the musical situation. Ebbs and flows, tempo or intensity increases, all happen 
spontaneously or non-reflectively. Indeed, if one tries to force such things, if conscious thought 
enters into it, it can appear artificial. To create a good “groove,” that is, a complex musical wave 
(we can call this a wave of flesh) made up of all the particular sounds of the individual 
instruments that seems to float between the band members (and on which the soloist improvises), 
it appears that conscious choice needs to be extinguished. Merleau-Ponty, in his later writings, 
acknowledges that when playing a sonata, for example, the player can be so immersed that a loss 
of self results: “The performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, 
and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata sings through him or cries 
out so suddenly that he must ‘dash on his bow’ to follow it.”61 As Galen A. Johnson put it, “…in 
musical performance and appreciation, as in love and beauty, we experience a dissolution of the 
self.”62 In these situations, the body has to take up this new world of sound. Just saying that the 
body takes up this world, however, is not exactly right. It is also actively creating it. So, the 
relationship between the body and this world is participatory because the body is bringing forth 
the music as well; notes are played or not played according to the current musical situation. That 
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is, the body, the creator, seems to be moved by the music itself, the creation; there is a 
reversibility between musician and music. What is happening here?  
As pointed out above, Merleau-Ponty argues that one can dilate one’s being-in-the-world. 
Through acquired habits, one can take up tools and have them become extensions of one’s body. 
In addition to the blind man example, Merleau-Ponty gives an example of the organist.
63
 The 
organ has become a part of the organist’s body. The keys are seen as representing potential 
sounds or, taking into account Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on synesthesia, potential colors, tactile 
feelings, or affects. His body can now literally paint the world with sonorous colors.  In this way, 
every band member’s body has become elongated; the members’ bodies, not their bodies plus the 
instruments, are creating a newly colored world. In doing this, they are creating, if the above is 
correct, a new layer of flesh. The bodies respond to each other to create this expression; this 
unified sound. Each player is like an individual organ within a new body or a new, expressive 
being. At times, the players can be so attuned to each other, responding to the slightest 
expression of each member and adjusting themselves accordingly that it is as if one body were 
playing the music; one body navigating the musical world. This is the last magical property one 
should recognize: a fusion of subjects into a larger body, with multiple conscious centers. These 
various conscious centers are not at the level of the cogito; in this state, they are all at the pre-
personal level. In this case, one is able to clearly see what Merleau-Ponty is referring to when he 
writes  
“Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other’s are one 
whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon, and the anonymous existence of which my body is the ever-
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renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies simultaneously. All of which makes another living being, but not yet 
another man.”64  
 The band members remain tied together by this sonorous power; remaining in that 
primordial connection (the pre-personal self) with this new musical world. A new being arises, 
yet not a new human self (that is, not a subject at the reflective level). We can see that Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of flesh, as Johnson points out, is a  
“…conception of Being itself that is prior to the split between self and others, between nothingness and the 
world. [Merleau-Ponty] speaks of a ‘single Vision’ in which I and others participate, in which others appear not as 
negations but as ‘outlines, deviations, and variants of one sole Vision…’ This single Vision that is pre-Being, prior 
to the division between self and others, is the ‘flesh of the world’”,65   
Both oneself and the other participate in a single vision. In the music example, the 
understanding of this vision is acquired by participating in, and being moved by the creation of 
music. In being connected with one’s fellow band members in a new body tied together by a 
sonorous flesh that one is unreflectively creating, the distinction between oneself and one’s band 
members begins to loosen. When music is performed in a religious setting, not only does the 
distinction between band members loosen, but the possibility of an encounter with the divine 
other is also made available. Although, following James, we must remain agnostic, we can 
conjecture that in religious contexts, such performances allows one to slip into a state of mind 
that provides an opening to alterity; an opening to both the human and divine other. Such an 
interpretation of these states is, therefore, far beyond the reductionism of the tacit cogito.  
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In Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty almost complains that music focuses too much on or is 
too closely connected with pure Being .
66
 Yet, why is this lamentable? Does it not show the 
fundamental features of incarnation? Just as the body can both touch and be touched, this new 
musical body can both affect (or, to stick with a metaphor from above, paint) and be affected (be 
painted). This again is fundamental to the nature of the flesh; as Madison has pointed out, the 
conception of the flesh is meant both to overcome the subjectivism that modernity had 
bequeathed to philosophy and to posit alterity within ipseity.
67
 This shows why I am not 
suggesting that in this state the distinction between one’s consciousness or point of view and that 
of the other vanishes (this is consistent with the phenomenological reports of the ravers above). 
As Madison writes, “The flesh is the trace of the other, the inscription of the other, in the 
subject’s own selfhood—in its very flesh. What ‘flesh’ ‘means’ is that the subject is for itself an 
other.” Now this is precisely what is happening in the band case. When one encounters this new 
flesh of the world, this new sonorous power, one is both encountering that which one is—the 
music, as argued above, is an extension of one’s body—and that which is foreign or other—it is 
also the extension of one’s alter-ego. The traces of the other are undeniable: there one is, folding 
over and being enfolded by the other’s extended body. Thus, this other is not violated; that is, the 
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other remains the alter-ego. There is no taking up of the other’s subjectivity. Instead, what one 
finds is best expressed when Leonard Lawlor writes 
“…the flesh…is sympathy.  It is the feeling of sympathy, therefore, that leads Merleau-Ponty in all of his 
last writings to speak of flesh as ‘indivision’ (VI 262/208), as ‘anonymity’(VI  254/201), as the Ineinander (VI 
234/180), and, of course, as the chiasm (VI 252/199)—instead of speaking of consciousness and subjectivity. But, 
all of these ways of speaking, including the flesh, describe inter-subjectivity. So, while the chiasm leads Merleau-
Ponty to speak of ‘rejecting…the notion of the subject’, it is precisely the chiasm of sympathy that brings about the 
resurrection of the subject.”68 
Thus, we have an anonymity. Yet, this does not erase the distinction between she who 
touches and she who is touched. Insofar as one is anonymous, however, the other as another 
anonymous being becomes closer. There is a distinction and yet there is nothing that one can 
point to (qua invisible) that would do the distinguishing. The other is an anonymous subjectivity, 
an alter-ego. Surely this recognition is best understood as sympathy in a metaphorical sense, and 
is the source of sympathy in everyday life.   Indeed, this is the starting point for a fecund 
phenomenological ethic and possibly a renewed relationship with that which is beyond all 
particulars.  
“…One might compare the feeling of sympathy with the Kantian feeling of the beautiful. What the feeling 
of the beautiful, like sympathy, responds to is the body…Merleau-Ponty defines the flesh by the reversibility of the 
double sensation. One must always recall that the experience of the double sensation—one hand touching the 
other—can take many forms, one of which is the hands folded together for prayer…From one’s solitude—indeed, 
from one’s ‘radical separation’—one implores the other to be there; one believes in the other, and the other confirms 
your belief when a person, when someone, reaches down and offers you a hand. Hands reaching out for hands 
establishes peace. The handshake is always, in Merleau-Ponty, a symbol of salvation. Through sympathy, everyone 
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is saved, even the weak. Therefore, sympathy is conservative feeling; the flesh is the mystery of the incarnation; and 
the chiasm is the sign of the cross turning into the vicious circle in which God is resurrected.”69 
As Lawlor argues, the resulting description of intersubjective relationships as 
characterized by sympathy arise from Merleau-Ponty’s starting point: that is, Merleau-Ponty, 
following Heidegger, starts with Being. That is, in using the phenomenological reduction, 
Merleau-Ponty brackets beings in order to discover what they are not—viz. Being. This 
bracketing is a via negativa towards Being. For Merleau-Ponty all ontology needs to be 
“indirect.” One cannot get to Being in-itself; one can only experience it indirectly through 
sympathy. It is interesting that Merleau-Ponty compares this indirect ontology to negative 
theology.
70
 In Lawlor’s estimation this Merleau-Pontean “diffraction of ontology” leads to 
religion.
71
 That is, it leads to the questioning of that which is always on the horizon; the flesh as 
at once sustaining and yet always beyond beings. It involves, that is, an openness to the Being 
that is at once immanent qua flesh, and yet surpasses all particulars, transcending them all qua 
the ground of beings.   
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V. Conclusion  
Throughout history, from mystery cults to Grateful Dead concerts, the Cartesian self has 
been overthrown, sacrificed in ecstatic states of revelry. In the case of Dionysiac fervor, for 
example, the dissolution is often given a religious significance: the divine other, Dionysus, has 
entered into the maenad; the two have become one. In the case of the raver or the Grateful Dead 
fan, since states of transformation are the genus of which religious or mystical states are a 
species, such states need not be deemed religious though they could very well be deemed so. 
This paper has analyzed such states (especially those connected with musical creation and 
appreciation). In doing so, it has used William James’ analysis of mystical states in The Varieties 
of Religious Experience as a guide. Indeed, despite the title, James appears to be examining the 
genus as much as the species in this work. In doing so, he offers a theory of selfhood that allows 
for multiple selves, only one of which is usually at the conscious level, though all of which have 
the potential to reach that level. Further, he argues that the subconscious could serve as a 
gateway for ‘external’ interaction with the human. In proposing such a theory, he allows for the 
possibility of genuine encounters with the divine. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, 
offers a phenomenology of embodied consciousness. Underlying this embodied consciousness is 
the tacit cogito upon which reflective consciousness grows. This paper has argued that changes 
in the body’s ordinary relationship with the world allows for, like Jamesian subliminal selves 
coming to the conscious level, the creations of new, unordinary selves (selves on the reflective 
level and that require interpretation). Further, I have argued that it is at least possible to have a 
pure experience of the tacit cogito, before all language. However, explaining such states by an 
appeal to the tacit cogito renders such non-ordinary selves epiphenomenal and the experience of 
the tacit cogito as a merely interesting psychological fact. When Merleau-Ponty goes beyond his 
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earlier thought and introduces the ontology of the flesh of the world, on the other hand, his 
thought allows for a genuine encounter with the other, perhaps even the divine other, le Tout 
Autre.  
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